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Abstract
In this paper, we present a mean field game to model the production behaviors
of a very large number of producers, whose carbon emissions are regulated by gov-
ernment. Especially, an emission permits trading scheme is considered in our model,
in which each enterprise can trade its own permits flexibly. By means of the mean
field equilibrium, we obtain a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation coupled with
a Kolmogorov equation, which are satisfied by the adjoint state and the density of pro-
ducers (agents), respectively. Then, we propose a so-called fitted finite volume method
to solve the HJB equation and the Kolmogorov equation. The efficiency and the use-
fulness of this method are illustrated by the numerical experiments. Under different
conditions, the equilibrium states as well as the effects of the emission permits price
are examined, which demonstrates that the emission permits trading scheme influences
the producers’ behaviors, that is, more populations would like to choose a lower rather
than a higher emission level when the emission permits are expensive.
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1 Introduction
Due to the rapid development of economy and society, every one should analyse and get
a clear understanding of a very complex system before making a decision. In particle physics,
mean field theory can be regarded as a useful and effective tool to study the performance
of large and complex stochastic model. It focuses mainly on a single particle and assumes
that the interactions of this particle with its neighboring particles is determined by the mean
field, in which the inter-particle interactions must be sufficiently “weak” or “regular” and
each particle tends to be infinitesimal, i.e., the number of particles tends to infinity.
Based on the above features of mean field theory, Lasry and Lions first defined and
developed mean field game in their three papers [1–3]. Different from the standard game
theory in which the number of players is finite, such as [4–7], mean field game studies the
limit case of a game with N players as N goes to infinity, which implies a continuum of
agents. Owing to this, mean field game can be used to deal with the problems, which should
be summed up by an untractable system of HJB equations in general differential games with
N players, where N is very large.
Several researchers have studied the theory and applications of mean field game in recent
years [8–12]. Especially, some interesting and meaningful works relating the mean field game
to economics have been done. Gomes et al. present effective numerical methods for two-state
mean field games and discuss a number of illustrative examples in socio-economic sciences in
[13]. Besides, in [14] Lachapelle et al. consider a technology choice problem with externalities
and economy of scale by using a mean field game stylized model. They introduce a monotonic
algorithm to find the mean field equilibria and describe the multiplicity of equilibria.
However, to our best knowledge, there are very few studies on mean field games to take
emission permits trading into consideration. For the past few years, the issues on climate
change and emission reduction have attracted the attention of politicians and scholars from
all over the world. In order to mitigate climate change and improve global environment,
some emission permits trading markets have emerged and are developing prosperously. At
the same time, a large number of articles have studied the emission permits price theoretically
and empirically [15–19]. Moreover, some differential game models about production decision
also include the emission permits trading scheme [20, 21].
Motivated by the those mentioned above, in this paper, we build a mean field game
model, in which the revenues from emission permits trading are included, to study the
productive behaviors of a continuum of agents under the background of climate change and
emission reduction. In our model, each agent is anonymous and the interactions among
agents are mean field type. They can obtain an initial quota from the emission permits
trading scheme, and purchase the emission permits from the market compulsively if the
quota is insufficient or sell the unused emission permits to others. The equilibrium of mean
field game can be reached by solving two coupled partial differential equations, one of which
is a backward HJB equation satisfied by the adjoint state, and the other one is a forward
Kolmogorov equation satisfied by the density of agents.
Some discussions about the numerical algorithms of the above coupled system have
been made for the past few years [13, 14, 22–24]. All of these methods are based on a finite
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difference scheme. In this paper, we propose a so-called fitted finite volume method to solve
the coupled equations model established by ourselves. The innovation of this method is in
that it couples a finite volume formulation with a fitted local approximation to the solution.
On the one hand, we implement the local approximation through solving a sequence of two-
point boundary value problems defined on each element. On the other hand, the finite volume
method possesses a special feature of the local conservativity of the numerical flux. The main
advantage of this discrete method is that the system matrix of the resulted discrete equation
is an M -matrix, which guarantees that the discretization is monotonic and the discrete
maximum principle is satisfied. The finite volume method, except for the fundamental fluid
dynamics problem in which it performs very well, has been used in many fields and is
becoming more and more popular. See, for instance, [25] for degenerate parabolic problems,
[26] for hyperbolic problems, and [27] for elliptic problems.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a mean field game model is established,
and the coupled partial differential equations are presented. Then, a so-called fitted finite
volume method is proposed for the discretization of the equations in Section 3. In Section 4,
some numerical experiments are performed to illustrate the efficiency and usefulness of the
numerical method, and the effects of the parameters on the density of population are also
showed in this section. Finally, concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
2 The mean field game model
2.1 The states of agents
For the purpose of illustrating the interactions among the players in a commitment
period, we propose a finite-horizon mean field game framework. We focus on a very large
economy and consider a continuum of agents. Each agent is a producer whose carbon
emission is regulated by governments. In our settings, all the producers have the same
capacity in production. They are anonymous but different in their initial production states
which follow a given initial probability density function. In addition, the interactions among
the agents are mean field type. That is to say, a given agent cannot influence the distribution
of all players’ states and therefore the decisions of others by itself. However, it can produce
an effect on the information which is used by others to make decisions. These ideas, as well
as the name of mean field, come from particle physics, and the particles are replaced by
rational agents here.
Let Q(t) denote the production of each agent during the period of [0, T ], where T is the
maturity of the game. This production leads to an amount of by-products, namely emissions
E(t). Generally speaking, an increase in production can result in more emissions and vice
versa. So, it is reasonable to use the emission as a state variable instead of production in this
paper. In fact, the emission level can be also treated as a product portfolio. The dynamics
of the agent’s emission is given by the following controlled process:
dEt = −τ(t, E)dt+ σdW + dNt(Et), (1)
where τ(t, E) is a control variable, and can be interpreted as the level of emission reduction.
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The term σdW stands for the stochastic disturbance of emission resulting from the techno-
logical innovations, market fluctuations, and some other uncertain factors. The constant σ
is a noise parameter and denotes the volatility of emission, and dW is the increment to the
standard Brownian process. In addition, the emission Et is restricted in [Emin, Emax] by the
reflection part dNt(Et), in which Nt is a monotonic continuous nondecrease function. For
more details about this formulation, please see [14] and [28].
Taking advantage of the dynamics of emission (1), we can obtain the forward Kol-
mogorov equation satisfied by the density of agentsm(t, E) for t ∈ [0, T ] andE ∈ [Emin, Emax]:
∂m
∂t
− 1
2
σ2
∂2m
∂E2
+
∂
∂E
(−τ(t, E)m) = 0, t ∈ (0, T ] and E ∈ (Emin, Emax),
m(0, E) = m0, E ∈ [Emin, Emax],
m′(t, Emin) = m′(t, Emax) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ],
(2)
where m0 is the initial density. This equation is also called the Fokker-Planck equation in
physical literature. The detailed derivation of this equation can be found in [14], [29], and
[30].
2.2 The revenues of agents
Every agent in our model should choose the best emission reduction level τ to maximize
its own net revenues, which consists of three parts, namely, the production revenue, the cost
of emission reduction, and the net revenue from the emission permits trading scheme.
Firstly, each player’s revenue arising from the production can be represented by an
increasing concave function R(Q(t)). Following [20] and [31], we assume that the relationship
between production and emissions is linear, and the production revenue function can be
expressed by the following quadratic functional form in terms of emissions:
R(E) =
AE − 1
2
E2
c1 + c2m(t, E)
,
where A = Emax, c1, and c2 are constants. Under this assumption, the marginal revenues
are positive and decreasing. In addition, the production revenue is decreasing with respect
to the density of agents m, which can be explained by the economical concept “negative
externality”, that is to say, an agent should face more intense competition and receive fewer
revenues if it chooses the same state as others’ ones.
Secondly, the cost of emission reduction should be
C(τt) =
τ 2t
2
.
This quadratic form guarantees increasing marginal mitigation cost.
Finally, the gains from emission permits trading are expressed by
T (E) = S(t) ∗ (E − E0),
4
where S(t) denotes the emission permits price and E0 is the initial quota. The trading
volume of emission permits E−E0 > 0 means that an agent purchases the emission permits
from the market, and E −E0 < 0 means that an agent sells the unused emission permits to
others, respectively.
2.3 The maximization problem and the optimal conditions
Now, we are in the position to define our maximization problem for each agent. That
is, the objective functional and the constraint condition are as follows:
max
τt
E
{∫ T
0
e−rt
[
AE − 1
2
E2
c1 + c2m(t, E)
− τ
2
t
2
− S(t)(E − E0)
]
dt
}
,
subject to dEt = −τtdt+ σdW + dNt(Et), E(0) = E0,
(3)
where r is the risk-free discount rate, and t = 0 is the initial time.
According to (2), this problem can be reformulated as follows:
max
τt
∫ T
0
e−rt
{∫ Emax
Emin
(
AE − 1
2
E2
c1 + c2m(t, E)
− τ
2
t
2
− S(t)(E − E0)
)
m(t, E)dE
}
dt,
∂m
∂t
− 1
2
σ2
∂2m
∂E2
+
∂
∂E
(−τ(t, E)m) = 0, m′(t, Emin) = m′(t, Emax) = 0,
(4)
with the initial condition m(0, E) = m0.
The solution of the above problem should correspond to the equilibria of mean field
game, in which every producer is atomized and has rational expectations.
Next, we will show the process of obtaining the optimal conditions for problem (4). To
begin with, we multiply v on both sides of equation (2) and integrate by parts to obtain the
following weak form:∫ Emax
Emin
(v(T,E)m(T,E)− v(0, E)m(0, E)) dE =
∫ T
0
∫ Emax
Emin
(
∂v
∂t
+
1
2
σ2
∂2v
∂E2
− τ ∂v
∂E
)
mdEdt
for every v ∈ C∞c ([Emin, Emax]× [0, T ]), where
C∞c (Ω) =
{
u ∈ C∞(Ω); suppu = {x; u(x) 6= 0} ⊂ Ω
}
.
Then, the Lagrangian of (4) should be
L(m, τ, v) =
∫ T
0
e−rt
{∫ Emax
Emin
(
AE − 1
2
E2
c1 + c2m(t, E)
− τ
2
t
2
− S(t)(E − E0)
)
m(t, E)dE
}
dt
+
∫ T
0
∫ Emax
Emin
(
∂v
∂t
+
1
2
σ2
∂2v
∂E2
− τ ∂v
∂E
)
mdEdt
−
∫ Emax
Emin
(v(T,E)m(T,E)− v(0, E)m(0, E)) dE.
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Taking the derivatives of Lagrangian with respect to m, τ and v, respectively, we can obtain
the following system:
∂v
∂t
+
1
2
σ2
∂2v
∂E2
− τ ∂v
∂E
− rv + f(E, τ,m, t) = 0, v(T,E) = 0,
τ = − ∂v
∂E
,
∂m
∂t
− 1
2
σ2
∂2m
∂E2
+
∂
∂E
(−τm) = 0, m(0, E) = m0, m′(t, Emin) = m′(t, Emax) = 0,
(5)
where f(E, τ,m, t) = − τ2
2
− S(E − E0) + AE−
1
2
E2
c1+c2m
− c2m(AE− 12E2)
(c1+c2m)2
. Clearly, we can see that
this system consists of two coupled equations, one of which is the backward HJB equation
and the other one is the forward Kolmogorov equation. In fact, the solution of this system
is the mean field equilibrium of our game.
3 Numerical methods
In this section, we will present a numerical method to discretize the first equation of
(5) for the reason that it is difficult to solve the equation analytically. In fact, here a fitted
finite volume method will be employed. Also, it will be shown that the system matrix of
the resulting discrete equations is an M -matrix, which guarantees that the discretization
is monotonic and the discrete maximum principle is satisfied, such that the scheme has a
unique solution. Besides, a two-level implicit time-stepping method is used to implement
the time-discretization. Since the structure of Kolmogorov equation is similar to the HJB
equation, here we only discuss the latter to save the space.
3.1 The fitted finite volume method for spatial discretization
A defined mesh for (Emin, Emax) is significant in the process of discretization. We first
divide the intervals I = (Emin, Emax) into N sub-intervals:
Ii := (Ei, Ei+1), i = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, ,
in which
Emin = E0 < E1 < · · · < EN = Emax.
For each i = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, we define another partition of I by letting
Ei− 1
2
=
Ei−1 + Ei
2
, Ei+ 1
2
=
Ei + Ei+1
2
.
To keep completeness, we also define E− 1
2
= Emin and EN+ 1
2
= Emax. The step is defined by
h = Ei+ 1
2
− Ei− 1
2
for each i = 0, 1, · · · , N .
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Then, for the purpose of formulating finite volume scheme, we write the first equation
of (5) in the following divergence form:
−∂v
∂t
− ∂
∂E
(
a
∂v
∂E
+ bv
)
+ cv − f(E, τ,m, t) = 0, (6)
where
a =
1
2
σ2, b = −τ,
c = r +
∂b
∂E
= r − ∂τ
∂E
.
It follows from integrating equation (6) over (Ei− 1
2
, Ei+ 1
2
) and applying the mid-point
quadrature rule to the resulting equation that
− ∂vi
∂t
li −
[
ρ(v)|E
i+12
− ρ(v)|E
i− 12
]
+ civili − fili = 0 (7)
for i = 1, 2, · · · , N−1, where li = Ei+ 1
2
−Ei− 1
2
, ci = c(Ei, t), vi = v(Ei, t), fi = f(Ei, τ,m, t),
and ρ(v) is a flux associated with v defined by
ρ(v) = a
∂v
∂E
+ bv. (8)
Now, we focus on deriving an approximation to the flux at mid-point, Ei+ 1
2
, of the interval
Ii for all i = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1. Consider the following two-point boundary value problem:
(av′ + bi+ 1
2
v)′ = 0, E ∈ Ii, (9a)
v(Ei) = vi, v(Ei+1) = vi+1, (9b)
where bi+ 1
2
= b(Ei+ 1
2
, t). A first-order ordinary differential equation can be obtained by
integrating both sides of equation (9a):
ρi(v) = av
′ + bi+ 1
2
v = C1,
where C1 is an arbitrary constant and can be determined by solving the above constant
coefficient two-point boundary problem analytically as follows:
ρi(v) = C1 = bi+ 1
2
eαiEi+1vi+1 − eαiEivi
eαiEi+1 − eαiEi , (10)
where αi = bi+ 1
2
/a.
By using (10), we can define a piecewise constant approximation to ρ(v) by ρh(v) sat-
isfying
ρh(v) = ρi(v) if x ∈ Ii (11)
for i = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1.
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Thus, substituting (11) into (7), we obtain the following results:
−∂vi
∂t
li + ei,i−1vi−1 + ei,ivi + ei,i+1vi+1 = fili, (12)
where
ei,i−1 = −bi− 1
2
eαi−1Ei−1
eαi−1Ei − eαi−1Ei−1 , (13)
ei,i = bi− 1
2
eαi−1Ei
eαi−1Ei − eαi−1Ei−1 + bi+ 12
eαiEi
eαiEi+1 − eαiEi + cili, (14)
ei,i+1 = −bi+ 1
2
eαiEi+1
eαiEi+1 − eαiEi . (15)
3.2 The implicit difference method for time discretization
Next we embark on the time-discretization of the system (12). To this purpose, we first
rewrite equation (12) as
−∂vi
∂t
li +Div = fili, (16)
where
D1 = (e1,1, e1,2, 0, · · · , 0),
Di = (0, · · · , 0, ei,i−1, ei,i, ei,i+1, 0, · · · , 0), i = 2, 3, · · · , N − 2,
DN−1 = (0, · · · , 0, eN−1,N−1, eN−1,N).
We select K − 1 points numbered from t1 to tK−1 between 0 and T, and let T = t0, tK = 0
to form a partition of time T = t0 > t1 > · · · > tK = 0. Then, the full discrete form of
equation (16) can be obtained by applying the two-level implicit time-stepping method with
a splitting parameter θ ∈ [1
2
, 1] to it:
(θD(E, τ, tk+1) +Gk)vk+1 = θf(E, τ, tk+1)li + (1− θ)f(E, τ, tk)li
+ (Gk − (1− θ)D(E, τ, tk))vk, (17)
where
D = (D1, D2, · · · , DN−1)>,
Gk = diag (−l1/∆tk, · · · ,−lN/∆tk)>,
for k = 0, 1, · · · , K − 1. Note that ∆tk = tk+1 − tk < 0, and vk denotes the approximation
of v at t = tk. Particularly, when we set θ =
1
2
, the scheme (17) becomes the famous
Crank-Nicolson scheme and is of second-order accuracy; when we set θ = 1, the scheme (17)
becomes the backward Euler scheme and is of first-order accuracy.
Given the initial condition of v at t = T , we can solve the values of v at the discrete
points (tk, Ei) by using (17).
The following theorem declares that the system matrix of system (17) is an M -matrix.
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Theorem 1. For any given k = 1, 2, · · · , K − 1, if |∆tk| is sufficiently small and c ≥ 0, the
system matrix of (17) is an M-matrix.
Proof. First, we note that ei,j ≤ 0 for all i, j = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1, j 6= i, since
bi+ 1
2
eαiEi+1 − eαiEi > 0 (18)
for any i and any bi+ 1
2
6= 0. This is because the function eαE is increasing when b > 0 and
decreasing when b < 0, where α = b
a
and a = 1
2
σ2. Moreover, (18) also holds when bi+ 1
2
→ 0.
Furthermore, from (13)–(15) we know that when ci ≥ 0, for all i = 1, · · · , N − 1, there holds
(ei,i)
k+1 ≥ |(ei,i−1)k+1|+ |(ei,i+1)k+1|+ ck+1i li.
Therefore, D(E, τ, tk+1) is a diagonally dominant with respect to its columns. Hence, from
the above analysis, we see that for all admissible i, D(E, τ, t) is a diagonally dominant matrix
with positive diagonal elements and non-positive off-diagonal elements. This implies that
D(E, τ, t) is an M -matrix.
Second, Gk of the system matrix (17) is a diagonal matrix with positive diagonal entries.
In fact, when |∆tk| is sufficiently small, we have
θcili +
li
−∆tk > 0,
which demonstrates that θD(E, τ, t) +G is an M -matrix.
Similarly, we can also discretize the third equation of (5) by using the above method.
The parameters in discrete scheme can be modified as follows:
Let b¯ = τ , α¯ = b¯/a and c¯ = 0. Then, the coefficients are given by
e¯i,i−1 = −b¯i− 1
2
eα¯i−1Ei−1
eα¯i−1Ei − eα¯i−1Ei−1 ,
e¯i,i = b¯i− 1
2
eα¯i−1Ei
eα¯i−1Ei − eα¯i−1Ei−1 + b¯i+ 12
eα¯iEi
eα¯iEi+1 − eα¯iEi + c¯ili,
e¯i,i+1 = −b¯i+ 1
2
eα¯iEi+1
eα¯iEi+1 − eα¯iEi .
These elements can build a matrix D¯ = (D¯1, D¯2, · · · , D¯N−1)>, where
D¯1 = (e¯1,1, e¯1,2, 0, · · · , 0),
D¯i = (0, · · · , 0, e¯i,i−1, e¯i,i, e¯i,i+1, 0, · · · , 0), i = 2, 3, · · · , N − 2,
D¯N−1 = (0, · · · , 0, e¯N−1,N−1, e¯N−1,N).
Consequently, the numerical discrete scheme for the Kolmogorov equation reads as
(θD¯(E, τ, tk) +Gk)mk = (Gk − (1− θ)D¯(E, τ, tk+1))mk+1. (19)
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3.3 The algorithm for (5)
In the above discussions, we have assumed that the control variable τ is known, and the
density m and the adjoint state v can be solved sequentially. However, we can see from the
second equation of (5) that τ is coupled with v. For this reason, we take an iterative method
to solve the three unknown functions τ , m, and v. The algorithm is presented as follows.
• Algorithm
Step 1: Give the initial guess of τ , and set it as τ 0. Set a tolerance threshold Tol > 0
and n = 0;
Step 2: Solve equation (19) to obtain mn;
Step 3: Solve equation (17) to obtain vn;
Step 4: Use vn to compute τn+1. Compute
n = max
i,k
‖(τ ki )n − (τ ki )n+1‖;
Step 5: If n ≤ Tol, let τ = τn+1, m = mn, v = vn, and stop. Otherwise, let n = n+ 1,
and go to Step 2.
4 Numerical results
So far, we have been able to show the results of our differential game model numerically.
We use the following parameter values to solve (5).
Parameters: T = 1, Emin = 1, Emax = 5, c1 = 10, c2 = 0.1, σ = 0.3, S = 0.2, E0 = 1,
r = 0.1.
4.1 The efficiency of the numerical method
First of all, we consider the convergence rate of our discretization method to show its
accuracy and efficiency. Owing to the limitation of space, we only test the adjoint state v.
Additionally, since the closed-form solution of (5) can not be found, we regard the solution
obtained by choosing N = K = 512 in both space and time, respectively, as the “exact”
solution v. We compute the errors in the discrete L∞-norm at the computational final time
step t = 0 on a sequence of meshes with N = K = 2n for a positive integer n from n = 4 to
a maximum n = 8. The discrete L∞-norm is defined as:
‖vh(E, 0)− v(E, 0)‖∞ = max
1<i<N
|vh(Ei, 0)− v(Ei, 0)|,
where vh denotes the numerical solution. The log-log plots of the computed maximum errors,
along with the linear fitting, are depicted in Figure 1. From the figure we can see that the rate
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of convergence of vh in the discrete L∞ norm is of the order O(h1.9843), where h = max
1<i<N
(hi).
Additionally, it demonstrates numerically that our numerical method for (5) governing the
mean field game is useful and efficient. Some theoretical analysis about the stability and the
convergence will be discussed in the future works.
10−2 10−1 100
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
h
Er
ro
r
 
 
0.0228*h1.9843
Error in vh
Figure 1: Computed errors in the L∞-norm at t = 0.
4.2 The solution of the model
In this subsection, two examples will be addressed to show the equilibrium states under
different conditions.
In the first one, the initial density of agents m0 follows a normal distribution, whose
mean and variance are 3 and 0.35, respectively. In this case, most of the agents initially
choose a medium emission level, and the number of agents whose emission level are maximum
or minimum tends to zero.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of density for this example. Clearly, we can see from figure
2 that as time goes on, the density of agents averagely disperses on the emission interval
[Emin, Emax] instead of concentrating at the medium emission level as the initial state did.
As mentioned above, the influence of mean field composed of all producers on each agent can
be explained by the economic concept “negative externality”. That is to say, the revenues
of each agent should decrease if there are a large number of agents at the same emission
level. To maximize own revenues, each agent tends to choose a different emission level from
others’.
11
Figure 2: Evolution of m.
The effect of emission permits price on the equilibrium state is presented in Figure 3. In
the figure, the horizontal axis is the emission level E, and the vertical axis is the density of
agents at the final time t = T , namely m(T,E). We plot three results in the cases of S = 0,
S = 2, and S = 4, respectively. Obviously, with the increasing of emission permits price,
the density in lower emission level increases, and the one in higher emission level decreases.
In other words, more population would like to choose a lower rather than a higher emission
level when the emission permits are expensive.
In the second example, we consider a situation in which most of the agents initially
stay together at a lower emission level. The initial density of agents is piecewise linear on
[1, 2) and [2, 5]. In addition, the emission permits price becomes time-dependent instead of
constant. It is zero at the beginning [0, 0.1), then increases from zero to maximum level
Smax = 2 at [0.1, 0.5), and keep this level to the end of the game, which is shown in Figure
4.
The equilibrium density of this example is presented in Figure 5. Similar to the first
example, the original obvious aggregation disappears after a period of time. In addition,
although the initial condition m0 is non-differentiable at E = 2, there is no irregular dis-
turbance in the neighbourhood of this point. This can reflect the stability of our algorithm
more or less.
Furthermore, Figure 6 shows the effect of the maximum emission permits price Smax on
the equilibrium. Here three cases, namely Smax = 1, Smax = 2, and Smax = 3, are considered.
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Figure 3: Effect of S on m(T,E).
The similar conclusion to the first example can be obtained. That is, the number of agents
in the lower emission level should be increasing as the maximum emission permits price level
rises.
5 Concluding remarks
We present a mean field game model to study the producers’ behaviors in an emission
permits trading scheme. In our model, there are a continuum of producers, and each producer
is homogeneous. The equilibrium of this game can be represented by a system containing a
forward Kolmogorov equation coupled with a backward HJB equation. We then propose a
so-called fitted finite volume method to discretize the resulted partial differential equations
and the corresponding system matrix is proved to be an M -matrix. The efficiency and the
usefulness of this method are illustrated by the numerical experiments. Our results show
that the convergence rate of our method is nearly O(h2). Besides, due to the externality,
each agent tends to choose a different emission level from the others’. Finally, we find that
the number of agents in lower emission level should be increase when the emission permits
are expensive.
We anticipate that our methodology from the perspective of partial differential equations
combined with numerical methods can make a few contributions to the solving of complex
problems arising from the interdisciplinary fields.
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Figure 4: Evolution of emission permits price S(t).
Figure 5: Evolution of m.
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